[B-1]
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
JUL 9 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Allegations Regarding "Operation Tailwind"
Allegations have been made that in the early 1970's a military operation in Laos called "Operation Tailwind" was directed toward US military defectors, and that Sarin Nerve gas was used during the operation.
You are directed to review military records, archives, historical writings, other appropnate information sources, and interview individuals with personal knowledge for the purpose of determining if there is any truth in this matter.
Please provide me with the results of your review within 30 days.
[Signature Bill Cohen]
U10018 /98
[End Tab B]
[C-1]
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
This document records remarks made June 23 in a meeting from 2:34 p.m. to 4:14 p.m. June 23 in Room 3E869, The Pentagon. The seven individuals listed below, all former U. S. Army officers, volunteered to share their knowledge of Operation Tailwind, a U.S. military operation conducted in September 1970 in Laos, with members ofthe Defense Department group investigating allegations made in a June 7 NewsStand [Time] CNN TV program concerning Operation Tailwind.
1. MG. John Singlaub, USA, (Ret.), a past commander of Studies and Observations Group (SOG), MACV;
2. COL John "Skip" Sadler, USA, (Ret.), Commander, SOG, Ground Studies Group during Operation Tailwind;
3. COL. Robert Pinkerton, USA, (Ret.), Operations Officer, SOG during Operation Tailwind;
4. LTC. Eugene "Gene" McCarley, USA, (Ret.), who, as a captain, commanded the Operation Tailwind force on the ground;
5. Maj. John Plaster, USAR, (Ret.), SOG member and author ofthe 1997 book, "SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam";
6. CPT. Michael "Gary" Rose, USA, (Ret.), medic on Operation Tailwind;
7. Mr. Rudy Gresham, personal representative of ADM Thomas H. Moore, USN, (Ret), and spokesperson for the Special Forces Association.
The meeting was chaired by Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Rudy de Leon.
MEETING
Secretary de Leon addressing the CNN allegations, made these introductory points:
Thanked guests for coming to the Pentagon to share their knowledge of Operation Tailwind and assist DoD in fulfilling the June 9 directive from the Secretary of Defense to inquire into the allegations made by CNN/Time concerning Operation Tailwind.
Invited guests to introduce themselves and indicate their role in Operation Tailwind.
[C-2]
DISCUSSION
SADLER: "The buck should start and stop here [with me]. I was responsible for planning it [Operation Tailwind], getting it approved, and directing it."
At no time was there any mention of defectors or deserters or nerve gas. Tailwind participants did not observe any "whites" or "round eyes" on the ground. Nerve gas was never used. This was a terrible piece ofjournalism by CNN.
Gen. [Creighton] Abrams approved the operation. He was briefed daily during the operation.
The After Action Report (AAR) of the operation should be on fiLe "somewhere in the Pentagon." There is nothing in that AAR that substantiates the CNN story about observing or killing defectors or using nerve gas. After the operation, there was never any report or even mention of any defectors encountered or nerve gas used.
DE LEON: Purpose of operation?
SADLER: There were two primary assignments for Operation Tailwind: 1) "to help relieve enemy pressure coming down from the north - it was a beehive there," and 2) "in the area of Chavane, we knew there was something in there in force." [Given that the enemy had put substantial assets in Chavane], "We had to go see why the area was s important to the enemy."
The operation succeeded in gathering exceptionally good intelligence about the enemy. "The two footlockers of documents we got, [General] Abrams described as 'the best logistics intelligence ever gained in the entire Vietnam war."' [The documents described the support structure for and operation of the Ho Chi Minh trail.]
PLASTER: [Gave a presentation using slides, including slides of photographs taken during the operation. The specific points he made are contained in his briefing slides and supporting paper packet. (The slides, less the slides of photographs, and supporting documents are attached to this MFR.) The presentation covered: dates and mission of the Tailwind operation; SOG organization, command and control relationships, and areas of operation; declassified pages from a U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam [MACV] report of operations; facts, arguments and statements by Tailwind participants that rebut the specific CNN/Time allegations; and attempts made during CNN' s preparation of their story to convince the CNN producers that they "had it wrong."]
SADLER: When [General] Abrams took over from [General] Westmoreland, he took more control of SOG operations. He resented the fact that an Army colonel [Col. Sadler] was commanding Navy and Air Force units.
PLASTER: For reasons of security, SOG was a compartmented organization. One part of the organization often didn't know what the other part was doing.
2
[C-3]
B Company ["Hatchet Forces"] conducted the Tailwind mission. The area of the mission was in Laos, where Highway 165 met Highway 966. That's about 10 kilometers east of Chavane (outside the area of operations) and 25 miles into Laos, not 200 miles as [Tailwind platoon leader llLt. Robert L.] Van Buskirk claims in his book - "that would put you 75 miles into Thailand."
"The idea [of Operation Tailwind] was to create a ruckus in the enemy' s rear so they'd have to pull back forces. The Hmong guerrillas could then seize their objectives, and in fact, they did."
From the time the Tailwind force landed in Laos September 11, 1970, they were fighting. About 12 soldiers from B Company were brought in to a landing zone (LZ) about 20 minutes before the operation began. Then two H-53s helicopters brought in the rest of the unit. Over the course of the mission, there were many US and Montagnard casualties.
On Day 4 of the operation, two dogs came up to Lieutenant Van Buskirk' s patrol. The patrol followed the dogs back to their owners in a Viet Cong [VC] base camp. It was not a village. There were no civilians in the base camp. There were no Caucasians.
The VC at the base camp put up a very poor defense. "The VC never believed we'd attack them from the ground that deep in Laos." As the photos document, the camp had bunkers to protect from air attack but no fighting bunkers to defend against ground attack. "They were bomb shelters, and we just threw in grenades." Further, the VC in the camp were inexperienced logistics soldiers, not trained combat soldiers.
USAF A-1 Skyraiders operating out of Thailand provided close air support (CAS). In some cases, when the CAS encountered heavy anti aircraft defenses, the forward air controller (FAC) called for CBU [Cluster Bomb Unit] 19, a concentrated tear gas, to suppress the anti aircraft.
DE LEON: Was that also referred to as "vomit gas"?
PLASTER: I heard it referred to as "sleeping gas." CBU 30 ordnance was similar to CBU 19. Tear gas was rarely used: "It was very close hold."
Q: Who had authority to employ tear gas in air strikes?
SADLER: I had the authority to call in tear gas. I could use it on my authority. We had tear gas in hand grenades as well. Headquarters 7th Air Force also had the authority to use tear gas on a case-by-case basis.
SINGLAUB: The proper term is "riot control gas." It was and is used by the police in this country. It has a very pronounced effect. "You feel like you're dying." We used it to suppress anti-aircraft fire.
3
[C-4]
CHARLES CRAGIN: Was riot control agent unique to the military or did civilian police use the same agent?
SINGLAUB: It was the same thing.
SADLER: The tear gas used does not require decontamination at all. "If it had been nerve gas, no one would have made it back from the operation alive."
BRIG. GEN. DAVID ARMSTRONG: Did the FAC (Forward Air Controller) lay on the tear gas or did you [McCARLEY] call for it?
McCARLEY: The FAC called it in, not me. We were carrying M17 gas masks. That was my SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) for missions.
PLASTER: The mask carrier was stamped "FOR RIOT CONTROL AGENT ONLY." The masks weren't in good enough shape to handle nerve gas.
I flew 450 missions in 1970 and 1971 in support of SOG operations. We never once used gas on any of those missions.
To use gas, the FAC would have to make the request through 7th Air Force.
McCARLEY: The FAC advised me the gas was coming in. He could see the NVA [North Vietnamese Army] massing. We had fought for four days and were out of water and almost out of ammo. We were exhausted. He could see that once we got to the extraction zone, we would be overrun. The FAC called for the gas. I never requested it.
SADLER: FAC's were our lifeline. We had no artillery that could fire that far [from Vietnam into the area of operations in Laos]. The FAC's provided all of our fire support.
PLASTER: [Showed photos of McCarley and Rose immediately after the mission with no shirts on (just after exiting the extraction helicopters).] (Rhetorically), "Do these men look like they just got hit with nerve gas? Rose was recommended for the Medal of Honor. He received the DSC (Distinguished Service Cross).
"The great accomplishment and byproduct of the operation was the satchels of documents we brought back." [Showed photograph of Montagnard soldier carrying satchels, as well as a slide of a MACV journal extract (attached). The extract notes the importance of the intelligence gained about the NVA 599th Transportation Group's operation of the Ho Chi Minh trail.]
CRAGIN: [CNN producer] April Oliver said she read the MACV journal cover to cover.
4
PLASTER: Yes. [Plaster explained the repeated efforts by himself and others to convince Oliver that her allegations were baseless. Those efforts are documented in the attached slides.]
ROSE: "My wounded were extremely distressed by the gas. We had stripped them down to lessen the weight and tied them to poles for transport. I couldn't do anything for them."
PLASTER: CNN relied on Jim Cathey, who said he was a member of "the Rat Pack Commandos." There was no such unit. Fox News just told us that Cathey is an Air Force supply sergeant who was stationed at Tan Son Nhat Air Base.
"Jay Graves was not a recon[naissance] team leader in Kontum. He was not in Operation Tailwind, but he was [nonetheless] interviewed [by CNN] for 71/2 hours."
I have four statements from people contacted by CNN. They denied the allegations. In each case, the producer, April Oliver, became angry when we wouldn't support her allegations.
McCARLEY: There was no mention whatsoever in briefings before or after Tailwind of "round eyes," POWs, or nerve gas.
(Rhetorically) With all of the photos taken of the base camp [including those just shown by Plaster], why were there no photos of these "round eyes" supposedly encountered? The photographic documentation was extensive and shows that there were no Caucasians encountered.
Rose should have gotten the Medal of Honor.
SADLER: Rose was wounded three times during the operation. He treated all 16 U.S. soldiers on the mission at least once each. He treated all of the wounded Montagnards.
McCARLEY: He shielded a wounded man with his own body. I don't think he ate or slept during the entire [four day] operation. He treated all of the wounded after the operation even though he was wounded himself. We were told the Medal of Honor was downgraded to a DSC because he [Rose] was not in an official combat status -- it was a "black operation."
SADLER: "Another reason the defector story doesn't pass muster is that it was a standing imperative that if you saw POWs, rescuing them became your mission, regardless of what mission you were on." There were incentives to returning with enemy POWs or deserters--$100 for us, and indigenous people would get a Seiko watch.
ARMSTRONG: CNN says they were told Tailwind was a reconnaissance in force What was the specific objective of the mission?
5
[C-6]
McCARLEY: "We were looking for a fight." The mission was to draw the enemy into our area and relieve pressure on our forces to the north--to test the enemy' s strength and to create a diversion. There were no specific recon objectives.
PLASTER: Our enduring goal was to take prisoners [for intelligence purposes], not to kill the enemy. We were an intelligence-gathering unit.
ARMSTRONG: [He read aloud the definition of a reconnaissance in force.] CNN wanted to know the objectives of the recon. They didn't understand that this [Tailwind] was an attack mission, not a recon.
McCARLEY: (Rhetorically) Out of the 200 people CNN interviewed, why did they just use those few individuals who did not deny the CNN allegations?
ROSE: "By Day 4 of the mission, the wounded were stacking up. There were a lot of guys on morphine, lashed to poles. It was hard for them to keep what was happening straight."
It wasn't a village we went into as CNN said, it was a compound. I came up [to the compound] after the fight was over. "I saw only two bodies, both dead from small arms fire, and I've seen enough people dead from small arms fire to know what that looks like."
[ROSE vividly recounted the final hours of the mission as the force moved to the evacuation point.] Describing the encounter with gas, he said: "We got hit with gas. It was CS [tear gas]. I know what CS is from basic training and from a prior incident at Kontum. It's like skunk. Once you smell it, you never forget, even if it's fifty years later. It was definitely tear gas. I was wincing, my eyes watered, my nose and lungs burned. You turn your face into the wind and it clears. My wounded were in distress. I never saw any evidence of nerve gas. It was CS! It's criminal to say our own Air Force would drop nerve gas on us!"
"On the LZ waiting to be extracted, we were running out of ammo. I went through all mine. The third ship [helicopter] coming in got hit and crashed into the water. I remember a Marine pulling us onto another helicopter to get us out."
"It's hard for me to have to explain to my 20-year-old daughter that we did nothing wrong. CNN owes us an apology and they need to say they got it wrong."
LT. COL. TOM BEGINES: We [ROSE and I] were talking before the meeting. He said something very important just in casual conversation but it should be discussed now. He said they carried atropine on the operation. Many of the media from their coverage of Desert Storm know that atropine is the acknowledged antidote for nerve gas. Some will take the fact that the patrol carried atropine as evidence we intended to encounter or use nerve gas.
6
[C-7]
ROSE: All of the medics I knew in A and B [Hatchet Forces] companies routinely carried atropine in syrettes on missions. These weren't the atropine dispensers that are used to treat for nerve gas. It wasn't carried because we thought we'd encounter nerve gas. We carried atropine because we didn't have any snake bit kits or anything to treat poisonous insect bites. I don't know if there are any scientific studies about it but we [the Hatchet company medics] believed that since snake venom and poisonous insect bites act on the nervous system like nerve gas, using atropine would slow down the venom' s action long enough to get a man to the hospital. I only had occasion to use atropine once in my entire time with the SOG, to treat a Vietnamese child bitten by a poisonous insect.
PLASTER: [Showed the group the award narration Lieutenant VAN BUSKIRK submitted soon after the mission for Specialist Five Craig Schmidt. The award narration composed by VAN BUSKIRK soon after the operation states in part "When the company later moved to a landing zone for extraction they were subject to tear gas . . . "] Van Buskirk said at the time that the gas he encountered was tear gas. There is no mention of supposed nerve gas.
PINKERTON: I never heard in the year I was SOG operations officer any reference to defectors.
Soldiers used the term "round eyes" to describe Caucasian women. I never heard those words used otherwise. Our mission was to rescue Americans. Command Sergeant Major Billy WALL [spelling?] was the greatest warrior I ever saw. He was a legend. But he was reduced to tears one time when we were alerted to the possible presence of American prisoners and they were moved before we could get them.
SADLER: We had two guys killed in attempts to rescue Americans.
SINGLAUB: Conceming the CNN statement that they attribute to me. CNN showed my picture and said that I had said.it may have been necessary to kill Americans. They used material from the interview I did with them a year ago. I initially refused the interview because Peter ARNETT was going to be involved: He's dishonest and despicable. CNN tricked me! They said ARNETT was not going to be involved. April OLIVER attached my comments out of context to a completely different story.
CNN did the same thing with Admiral MOORER.
I think CNN took statements from many people completely out of context. I told CNN producer OLIVER many times there was no story. ARNETT just wanted to air his old contention -- first made by him years ago during the war -- that nerve agent was used in Vietnam.
It's sad that we have to spend so much time and energy defending ourselves against allegations of things that never happened.
7
[C-8]
The story that has not been told and should be told to the American people is our efforts to rescue Americans.
GRESHAM: These sensational, untrue allegations are just like those made in the media that U.S. special forces were involved in the assassination of Martin Luther King. I worked for two years as the spokesperson for special forces to dispel those completely false allegations. We prevailed. Colonel John SMITH in Army Public Affairs can tell you all about that.
Colonel SMITH called me two or three days before CNN aired their story. He'd been informed of seven and seven-and-one-half hour interviews of people conducted by CNN for this story. There were repeated attempts by CNN to twist their words.
The CNN story made headlines in London, Paris, all over the world.
I'm also the special forces investigator for these allegations.
"MOORER told the Balfimore Sun that CNN put words in his mouth."
"[After the CNN interview] Admiral MOORER and I had very candid conversations." [Retired Army Chief of Staffl Bruce PALMER and General DAVIS know Admiral MOORER. MOORER called me and asked me to be his spokesperson. The allegation was made after the CNN story aired that the Pentagon pressured him to clarify the record but he told me the Pentagon never pressured him.
[During my service in Vietnam], I also worked as PA [Public Affairs] for WESTMORELAND.
I got a telephone call from Tom JOHNSON, President of CNN. I told him CNN was flat wrong in their story. CNN sent a producer named Jim CONNORS [spelling?] to see me. I rebutted all of their allegations in detail and gave them the true facts. I pointed out that CNN had virtually no documentation to support their allegations. CNN offered Jay GRAVES' [a CNN source for their story] DD Form 214 [Record of Service] showing he was in Vietnam as supposed proofthat he was on Tailwind. That's laughable! CNN's response to me was that I was "naive" about what happened ! CONNORS said he did not have the authority to retract the story.
There are 15,000 members in our special forces association. I asked for any information that might give any credibility to the CNN allegations. I've gotten nothing in response.
The former SOG members present gave an exclusive to Fox Network today. We also talked to ABC.
ARMSTRONG: Tailwind was our deepest operation into Laos. Did you need special permission to do Tailwind?
8
[C-9]
SADLER: I'll give you a qualified "yes." ABRAMS had the authority to order the operation but it required the tacit consent of other organizations. We let people know about the operation and their silence meant acquiescence.
PINKERTON: I sent a message to CINCPAC [Commander-in-Chief, Pacific] before the operation.
Q. [ARMSTRONG?] With regard to the U. S. ambassador to Laos. Did you need to have his permission to use tear gas, especially since that might be portrayed as using a new weapon, an escalation, and the political situation was tense at the time?
SADLER: ABRAMS said to get ambassadorial approval. We went to NKP [Nakhon Phanom, Thailand].
SINGLAUB: I'd go to NKP or Udom [also in Thailand] to coordinate operations in Laos.
CAPTAIN (USN) PETROPAOLI: Wouldn't the SOG know when CS gas was being loaded on Air Force aircraft for use?
SADLER: We coordinated with C-130s for airstrikes. The code words were "hillsborough" during the daytime and "moonbeam" during the nighttime.
PLASTER: There was a brigadier general with the airborne FAC in such cases, I think with his Laotian counterpart.
ARMSTRONG: Yesterday, CNN made the contention that the ambassador would have to approve the use of new weapons [like tear gas].
SADLER: We got clearance from NKP during the initial coordination for the operation. The ambassador did control things in Laos.
ARMSTRONG: I talked with Admiral MOORER. It wasn't clear to me what he actually said to CNN.
GRESHAM: He's 86. He said OLIVER tried to put words in his mouth. He said he never saw documentation but "had heard rumors" of the use of sarin. He said that 24 hours before the CNN program aired CNN tried hard to get him to say he knew sarin had been used. CNN did three sessions with him. They tried to charm an 86-year-old man. He told me he is now clear in his mind that there was no nerve gas, no defectors. Everything that he said that was controversial was said off camera. CNN said he read the transcript before their prograrn aired but he said he only glanced at it.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS KEN BACON: I think CNN is "this close" to retracting the story.
9
[C-10]
UNDER SECRETARY De LEON: We want the true story told.
BACON: Who is Michael HAGEN?
PLASTER: He's one ofthe 16 U.S. participants in the operation. Ted WISEREN [spelling?] believes CNN told HAGEN "his paralysis is the result of the nerve gas used during Tailwind."
BACON: He's quoted by CNN saying, "The government doesn't want you to know, but I know it was nerve gas."
ROSE: My wife talked to him yesterday.
"I'm living proof that toxic gas was not dropped on us that day. Nobody showed any signs of exposure to toxic gas."
BACON: Was there ever any nerve gas [stored] in Laos or Thailand?
PLASTER: I can say conclusively, and I've done a lot of research into SOG operations, that I've never heard of any nerve gas in country.
SINGLAUB: Commanders tell me that nerve gas was not available. Talk with Harry C. "Hinnie" ADERHOLT [spelling?] in Fort Walton Beach, Florida.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHERIDAN: Besides tear gas, what else was unusual about the Tailwind operation?
PINKERTON: It was the largest force [company-size] we had ever committed in Laos up until then. Usually, the SOG missions were just three to five man operations on the ground. We would go after lucrative intelligence targets. It was also a sensitive mission because it was outside the normal AO [area of operations].
SINGLAUB: The story of "Salt and Pepper" [the supposed two U.S. defectors] has existed for a long time. I think it's a disinformation campaign.
CRAGIN: What kind of lead time was there for the FAC to call in tear gas?
McCARLEY: It was normally 2-3 hours from the time of request. Again, I didn't call in the tear gas so I don't know.
PLASTER: "'Sandies [sp?]' was the codeword for fire suppression for SAR [Search and Rescue]. Any SAR people will tell you they had aircraft on strip alert. Some could have been loaded with CBU- 19 [tear gas] . They could have been diverted to the Tailwind operation on an emergency basis when the operation ran into trouble. They knew there were heavy anti-aircraft defenses and the Tailwind force was in serious trouble.
10
[C-11]
ARMSTRONG: They knew they had to do an extraction. The Air Force could have planned to use tear gas.
CRAGIN: Do you know the names of any of the FAC's that day?
McCARLEY: All three SOG "covey riders" with the FACs have died.
PLASTER: Lloyd G. O'DANIELS is an auditor in Springfield, Virginia. He flew as a backup FAC that day.
Air Force General EBERHART [now Vice Chief of Staff] was with the FAC unit but he went home [to the U.S.] before Tailwind.
DAVIDSON: I've talked with some A-l guys but I've not been able to locate the FAC that day the tear gas was used.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHWEITER: Do you know the name or callsign of the pilot who dropped the tear gas?
PLASTER: Newsweek says it was Art Bishop.
One more thing. The SOG deserves a Presidential Unit Citation for Tailwind. It was a black operation, now declassified. They deserve it.
SADLER/PINKERTON/ROSE: [Strongly agreed.]
Other OSD aKendees at the meeting are as follows:
Mr. C. Cragin, Acting ASD(RA); Mr. W. Davidson, AA to SECAF; Mr. J.B. Hudson, AA to SECARMY; Ms. J. Fites, DUSD(PI); CAPT J. Pietropaoli, JCS; BG D. Armstrong, USA, (Ret.), JCS; Mr. R. DestaKe, DPMO;COL E. Winborn, OSD(LA); Mr. J. Schweiter, DASD(M&P); Col T. Bowman, OUSD(P&R); Mr. K. Bacon, ASD(PA); Mr. B. Sheridan, PDAS(SO/LIC); Mr. B. Carson, OUSD(P&R); Cdr D. Newman, OGC.
THOMAS J. BEGINES
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Designated as Recorder
Attachments
11
[C-12]
Suggested Citation Accompanying
Statement of Lt. Robert Van Buskirk
Specialist Five Craig D. Schmidt, 543-60-1312, United States Army, Special
Operations Augmentation, Command and Control Detachment Central, 5th Special
Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Republic of Vietnam, is recommended
for award of the Silver Star Medal for heroism in battle during the period
12 through 14 September 1970 in connection with military operations against
hostile enemy force in the Republic of Vietnam. SP5 Schmidt was serving as
a squad leader with a company-size exploitation force that was on a mission
deep in enemy-controlled territory. On the morning of the 12th, the first
platoon came under fire from an estimated 40 NVA employing automatic weapons,
B-40 rockets, mortars and hand grenades. SP5 Schmidt uas called upon to reinforce
the left flank. He immediately moved his men into position but uas wounded
by an enemy grenade. Some of his SCU [Montagnards] squad members were also
wounded and others refused to advance into the heavy fire. Although wounded,
SP5 Schmidt continued his advance into the fire, disregarding his own safety
and delivering heavy fire on the enemy. Only two of his squad members followed
him. Their accurate fire killed many of the enemy and the others were forced
to withdraw to the right where they were cutoffby another squad. This contact
lasted over an hour. SP5 Schmidt's aggressiveness and excellent conduct under
fire greatly contributed to the annihilation of almost the entire enemy force.
The next day, 13 September, another group of enemy struck the forward element
of the company as they left their RON [rest overrlight] site. SP 5 Schmidt
had been wounded a second time and was in the center of the company with
the other wounded personnel. Two men were attempting to hold off the numerically
superior enemy force. SP5 Schmidt left his safer position with the other
wounded and moved alone to the point of contact and began firing on the enemy.
On the 14th of September the point element was again pinned down by enemy
fire, from the direct front. The squads moved on line and began an assault
on the enemy position. SP5 Schmidt was the leader of one of these squads
and despite his wounds he charged forward towards the enemy location. They
soon discovered that the enemy were trying to protect their base camp, a
battalion-size, well-defended area. SP5 Schmidt led his men into the camp,
through the enemy fire. The assault was a success and 54 enemy were found
dead in the camp. There were more dead on the flanks and in the front. When
the company later moved to a landing zone for extraction thev were subjected
to tear gas that had been dropped bv friendly aircraft but then drifted
to their position. There were three minutes in which to find an LZ.
Although wounded and sick from the gas SP5 Schmidt ran past his point
man and began jumping up and down to flatten the tall elephant grass. It
was largely due to his actions that the landing zone was cleared and the
company was able to be extracted. His courage and valor throughout this operation
reflect great credit upon himself and are well deserving of the Silver Star
Medal.
| 1. Eyewitness Statement
2. Proposed Citation |
Robert L. Van Buskirk 1LT, |
[Signature] |
[C-13]
TRUE FACTS
CONCERNING OPERATION TAILWIND
DATE: 11 - 14 September 1970
LOCATION: Target Area Tango-Two, eighteen kilometers east of Chavane, Laos
UNIT: Company B, Command & Control Central, (Special Operations Augmentation), 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Kontum, Republic of Vietnam
COMMANDER: Captain Eugene C. McCarley
MISSION: Conduct a diversionary attack along the Highway 165 road structure, to draw NVA forces away from the Bolovens Plateau, to support an attack there by CIA-supported guerrillas
FORCES INVOLVED: Co. B, CCC, with 16 USSF and 120 Montagnards, support by
USAF A-l Skyraiders; USMC HH-53 and AH-1 Cobra gunship units from Danang,
South Vietnam.
[C-14]
[Figure C-1]
[C-15]
[Figure C-2]
[C-16]
MACV-SOG
SOG was a Joint Service, Unconventional Warfare Task Force, which existed JAN 1964 - APR 1972, with responsibility for:
--Operating (indigenous) agent networks in North Vietnam, Laos & Cambodia;--Reconnaissance and Surveillance along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and enemy base areas in Laos and Cambodia;
--Small-scale (company or less) raiding and road interdiction missions along the Laotian highway system;
--Crafting and Dissemination of "black propaganda ' in support of the U.S war effort;
--POW and MIA tracking, and attempted recover /rescue;
--Working in collaboration with other U. S. agencies (CIA, NSA, etc ), on special efforts uhich relate to the above missions.
[C-17]
CNN/TIME SPECIFIC ALLEGA TIONS
During the September 1970 Operation Tailwind, a raid by SOG personnel behind enemy lines in southern Laos:
Time article: ". . . the reason for the raid: The targeted village as believed to be harboring a large group of American G.I.s uho had defected to the enemy. The Special Forces units job was to kill them."
The article went on to allege that this operation twice employed sarin nerve gas, both as a preparatory attack on the "village" the night before the SOG ground force hit it, and at the very end ofthe operation, to facilitate extraction ofthe SOG men.
Therefore, there are three distinct charges:
1. SOG targeted and killed unarmed, unresisting Arnerican defectors in Laos.
2. That SOG men killed women and children in the Laotian "village."
3. To support this operation, the USAF dropped sarin nerve gas on two occasions.
[C-18]
Van Buskirk's Claim he Killed American "Defectors"
Time article [15 June]:
"Suddenly Van Buskirk spotted two "longshadows," a name for taller Caucasians. One was sliding down a "spider hole" into the underground tunnel system beneath the camp. The other was running toward it. "Early 20s. Blond hair. Looks like he was running off a beach in California," remembers Van Buskirk.... The lieutenant gave chase but just missed the blond man as he slipped into the tunnel. He shouted down the hole, identifying himself and offering to take the man home. "F_ you," came the reply. "No, it's f_ you," answered Van Buskirk as he dropped in a white phosphorous grenade, presumably killing both longshadows."
Van Buskirk was the only Tailwind participant to claim Americans or Caucasians were present. CNN offered "confirrnation" by two men who were not on the ground in Laos, and did not participate in this operation.
[C-19]
CNN/TIME'S STORY OF THE SURVEILLANCE
MISSION DOES NOT STAND UP
It's claimed one team obserVed the "village" from two miles away, with only binoculars [Newsweek], yet the recon men could discern between Asians and Caucasians:
--The area of Operation Tailwind is heavily jungled, with visible line-of-sight measured in tens of yards;
--Ordinary binoculars lack the magnification and acuity to resolve human shapes two miles away, so the race of someone under surveillance cannot be discerned;
--The (likely fraud) Sgt Jim Cathey claimed the codeword for Americans was "longshadows," while the actual SOG codeword was "Strawhats."
[C-20]
CNN FALSELY CLAIMED AN ADVANCE RECON
MISSION HAD SURVEILLED THE "VILLAGE" IN LAOS
--Captain McCarley, the mission comrnander, knows no such advance recon took place;
--The two CNN/Time sources had nothing to do with this operation--they were not there and their alleged recon mission could not have happened:
--Maj. Plaster served in the recon company responsible for such missions in this area of Laos, personally knew the other 15 or so recon team leaders who would have had to have run such an operation, and knows that neither of these men served in his reconnaissance unit.
--One man, USAF Sgt. Jim Cathey, told the media such a fantastic story that he is almost certainly a fraud.
--The other man, Sgt. Jay Graves, a genuine Special Forces Vietnam veteran, never participated in cross-border operations into Laos. He served in SOG for only a few months in 1970, as an instructor, not a field operative. But his quotes in CNN and Time never quite claim he was on Tailwind.
[C-21]
COMMAND & CONTROL CENTRAL
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
Kontum, South Vetnam
Area of Responsibility: Southern Laos along Ho Chi Minh Trail corridor, and northern Cambodia, each to a depth of about 12 miles.
Duties: Conduct top secret, deniable unconventional reconnaissance and raiding missions behind enemy lines in Laos and Cambodia.
[Figure C-3]
[C-22]
CNN'S CLAIM THAT THE TARGET WAS A
"VILLAGE"
IS SUPPORTED ONL Y BY TWO MEN WHO WERE NOT THERE
--Not even Lt. Van Buskirk claimed it was a "village."
--USAF Sgt. Cathey (identified by Newsweek as a supply sergeant] was not on this operation, and his claims reek of fraud;
--U. S. Anny Sgt. Jay Graves could not have been there--he was not assigned to CCC, the unit responsible for such missions in this part of Laos.
[C-23]
OP/ED PIECE BY A USMC COBRA PILOT
[Extract from Monterey, Calif. Herald, 14 June 98]
Lt. Joe Driscoll:
"To listen to CNN you'd have thought that nerve gas uas dropped and the good guys ualked out over dead bodies. That wasn't the way it was.... They distorted, sensationalized and misrepresented it to fit their political spin and marketing hype.. . If it really is a fact that nerve gas was used, the real story would have been that it hadn't worked so well."
[C-24]
CONFIRMATION BY A USMC HH-53 PILOT
[Extract from 1997 book, Primer of the Helicopter War]
Captain Bill Beardall, HMH-463:
"We were briefed by a U.S. Army captain uho told us we were going to carry 200 Americans and Montagnards deep into Laos. We were to be a diversionary force for a large-scale attack on a major artery of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. "
And reference the extraction, four days later:
"It was going to be close and my gas mask was restricting my view. The area had been prepped with a vomiting agent to help Keep the bad guys' heads down."
[C-25]
CONFIRMATION BY USAF A-1 SKYRAIDER PILOTS
USAF A-1 Pilot, "Spad 03," Tom Stump:
[Extract from e-Mail Message]
"...I am trying to let everyone know this Sarin thing is bullshit but I must admit I do not remember this mission like it was yesterday."
[Extract from e-mail message to MG Perry Srruth, (ret.)]
"I can only tell the truth of what happened that day. There was never any Sarin gas on that battlefield. Had there been, those 16 Americans would now be memorialized on a Wall in Washington. . . "
[C-26]
CONFIRMATION BY USAF A-1 SKYRAIDER PILOTS
USAF A-1 Pilot, Art Bishop:
[Newsweek, 22 June 1998]
"Art Bishop, one of the two American pilots who bombed the enemy, wrote in his journal the next day that his payload was 'CBU-30'--tear gas. The allegation of sarin gas, he told Newsweek is a "lot of nonsense."
[C-27]
VAN BUSKIRK ALLEGED SOG ENCOURAGED
THE KILLING OF AMERICAN DEFECTORS
CNN Transcript [7 June]:
It was pretty well understood that if you came across a defector and could prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, do it, under any circumslance, kill them. It wasn't about bringing them back, it was to kill them.
FACT: As an intelligence-gathering organization, SOG's highest accolades went to men who brought back enemy prisoners--and an American defector would have been a bonanza on a par with a capturing a high-level enemy officer.
FACT: To emphasize the importance of capturing prisoners, SOG offered three special incentives to those who brought them back:
A. Bonus of $100 to each American.
B. Bonus of cash and a new Seiko wristwatch to each indigenous team member.
C. A "free" R&R to Taiwan or Bangkok for Americans.
FACT: Major Plaster and his teammates received these bonuses for capturing a prisoner five months before Tailwind in Laos, operating from the same base as Van Buskirk.
[C-28]
Although Time and CNN alleged the objective was a village harboring U.S. defectors, Lt. Van Buskirk contradicted both claims during a subsequent Q&A Session:
VAN BUSKIRK: .... Understand this camp was a military base camp. We had attacked it at first light. Our LZ as on the other side. We were almost beat before this. We were all wounded. Were just about out of ammunition. And we'd come into the camp quite by accident. My sergeant and I had seen two dogs, and we decided to follow the dogs, kill their owners, and then go to the LZ. The dogs took us to the camp.... "
[C-29]
LT. VAN BUSKIRK'S CHANGING STORY
Upon return, Capt. McCarley and Lt. Van Buskirk traveled to Saigon to brief Gen. Creighton Abrarns. Due to his head wounds, Capt. McCarley had Van Buskirk deliver the briefing while he and Chief SOG, Col. John Sadler, watched.
In his formal briefing notes, Lt. Van Buskirk:
--Admitted the mission was "to create a diversion in support of, and in consonance with, the CAS [CIA] launched Operation Gauntlet."
--Only once cited the use of gas--"CBU-19" (CS tear gas)--which was employed "to prep the area" and assist their unit extraction.
--His briefing does not mention American defectors, nerve gas or a "village."
[C-30]
CNN "VERIFICATION" OF NERVE GAS BY SP5 CRAIG SCHMIDT
Time article [15 June]:
"It doesn't surprise me in the slightest bit that it was nerve gas. It worked too well." [attnbuted to Craig Schmidt]
No such on-camera quote was offered in the 7 June CNN report.
Schmidt told Washington Times [17 June]:
"I still today don't know where they got my quote. I would never have said that." he said. "I don't know what it was. I believe my exact quote uas, I would be surprised if it was nerve gas. "'
On 14 June, Schrnidt told CNN the [unknown] gas was effective:
"It had a dramatic effect on the amount of resistance ue encountered, as soon as it was deployed from the A-1Es. It was almost instantaneous. It was very quick."
[C-31]
LT. VAN BUSKIRK'S CHANGING STORY
1983: Although his book, Tailwind, contains not one hint of defectors or nerve gas, his Author's Note says:
"this book is, to the best of my memory, a true account of what took place.
June 1998: Van Buskirk tells Newsweek:
...he had forgotten the nerve gas and defectors entirely for 24 years--until he suddenly recalled the events during a five-hour interview with CNN producer April Oliver this year.... he had repressed the memory on Easter Sunday 1971... [while] he was in a German prison on charges that he had sold weapons to a terrorist gang. (The charges were later dropped.)... he had a vision of Christ on that Easter Sunday morning, he had been drinking heavily and was haunted by nightmares."
[C-32]
IN SEPTEMBER 1970, LT. VAN BUSKIRK
SIGNED A STATEMENT THAT CS GAS WAS EMPLOYED
Shortly after the operation, Lt. Van Buskirk submitted SP5 Craig Schmidt for a Silver Star for Tailwind. In the suggested citation (signed by Van Buskirk) that accompanied his eyewitness statement, Van Buskirk wrote:
"When the company later moved to a landing zone for extraction they were subjected to tear gas that had been dropped by friendly aircraft but that had drifted to their position.... Although wounded and sick from the gas, SP5 Schmidt ran past his point man and began jumping up and down to flatten the tall elephant grass.... "
[C-33]
LT. VAN BUSKIRK SAYS "NERVE GAS"
ALLEGATIONS CAME NOT FROM HIM BUT FROM CNN
[Baltimore Sun, 15 June 1998]
"It was CNN, Van Buskirk says, that told him about the nerve gas after he told ~hem he had been choking and vomiting as he ran to the helicopters. He had always assumed it was tear gas."
" 'What they said was, ' "The symptoms you're describing are the symptoms of nerve gas, not tear gas." ' 'They said ' "What have you go to say about that?" ' "
[C-34]
CNN KNEW TAILWIND MEDIC DENIED
ANY USE OF NERVE GAS
[E-mail Message]
Sgt Gary Rose, the Tailwind medic, submitted for the Medal of Honor:
"...I was interviewed by telephone by Amy Karsada, (CNN), and could not say poison gas was used. So anyone who could place doubt about the use of nerve gas was not placed on camera."
"If they had dropped GB on us, I think a lot fewer of us (like possibly none) would be alive. Concentrated CS mixed in some type emolument would have stopped almost anyone in their tracks. I think the gas used was a concentrated CS."
[C-35]
SOG VETERAN WARNED CNN THE ALLEGATIONS
WERE WRONG
LTC Edward Wolcoff, USA (ret) was contacted several times by CNN producer April Oliver, each time explaining to her in detail why these allegations were either distruthful or illogical. Oliver insisted she had "interviewed approximately 200 people" and "authoritative figures" had confirrned the information.
"Despite my best efforts to focus Ms Oliver on a more reasoned line of inquiry, she apparently found it more profitable to formulate a bizarre premise and exploit it for sake of the drama and controversy--regardless of the facts."
[Faxed statement to Maj. Plaster, 21 June 1998]
[C-36]
THE ONLY TAILWIND PARTICIPANT ON-CAMERA TO VERIFY
VAN BUSKIRK'S CLAM OF NERVE GAS
Sgt. Mike Hagen, a Tailwind Participant:
[CNN Transcript] Nerve gas. The government don't want it called that. They want to call it incapcitating agent, or some other form. But it was nerve gas.
But prior to the broadcast, he phoned SOG veteran Ted Wicorek and said he had no idea what was causing his limb paralysis--Wicorek says in an e-mail message, [20 June 1998], "He asked me if I could confirrn the rumors that he has heard that nerve gas was used on Operation Tailwind."
[C-37]
CNN ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE A SOG VETERAN
NERVE GAS HAD BEEN USED
BUT DID NOT MENTION HIS DENIAL
[E-mail Statement of Sgt. Ted Wicorek]
"April Oliver called three or four times before she reached me. In the beginning she was quite pleasant... the first thing she wanted to know about was the use of nerve gas. I told her that no nerve gas was used on Operation Tailwind. At this point she said she had high-ranking sources that confirmed that it was nerve gas.... I told her that there were absolutely no nerve gases used in Operation Tailwind. At this point the conversation deteriorated into a mental chess game.... She kept coming back to nerve gas and I noted that she was becoming irritated when I would not give in on this point. She indicated that she did not believe I was telling the truth.... ''
[C-38]
CNN ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE MAJOR PLASTER
THAT POTENTIALL Y LETHAL GAS HAD BEEN USED
BUT DID NOT MENTION HIS DENIAL
[Statement of Major John Plaster, 21 June 1998]
"On two occasions during the fall of 1997, after the initial SOG piece had been aired on CNN, I uas phoned by April Oliver. Each call was at least an hour in length. Among various (false) allegations she presented to me, she claimed that a SOG force had wiped out a "village " in Laos, killing women and childen, and had employed an exotic gas--not CS--in some operations. I talked her through these assorted allegations, explaining to her in considerable detail why I thought these charges uere not credible. No matter how many people she could get to confirm such charges--and she insisted she had already erified these things--that it would not turn a falsehood into a truth. At the end of the second comersation, she uas very irritated uith me. Despite being the single greatest repository for SOG documents, and my direct contact with hundreds of SOG veterans, she never contacted me to verify any facts or allegations."
[C-39]
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE THAT NO
LETHAL NERVE AGENT WAS USED
When the Tailwind commandos retumed to the SOG helipad at Kontum --approximately 1.5 hours after the CS was used to extract them--Major Plaster, among other Green Berets, greeted them:
--The SOG commandos were wearing ordinary jungle fatigues, not chemical protective suits;
--Neither Arnericans nor Montagnards were suffering any visible symptoms of any kind of gas--even the CS effects had worn off;
--No one went through any kind of decontamination--they dropped gear in their team rooms, and while some went to a quick debrief, others gathered in the club to drink and share their war stories;
--Not one man that night cited any kind of poisonous gas, although it was commonly known that CS tear gas had been used to extract them
--Maj. Plaster heard not one man say anything about "Americans" or "defectors."
[C-40]
SOURCE: Major Plaster's Book
As ofthe surnrner of 1997, CNN and April Oliver had a copy of Major Plaster's book, which includes a six-page description of Operation Tailwind. Oliver told Maj. Plaster she'd read it from cover to cover.
Maj. Plaster does not cite a village, women and children, nerve gas or American defectors. His account was based upon
--Declassified SOG documents
--Interviews with Chief SOG, Col. John Sadler, Col. Bobby Pinkerton, Lt. Col. Michael Radke, Staf~Sergeant John Padgett and Spec. 5 Craig Schmidt
--A history of CIA operations in Laos
--And his own recollections.
[C-41]
Why Was There Minimal Enemy Resistance In the Camp?
NOTE: This enemy basecamp was not prepped with gas of any kind
1) Enemy forces were inexperienced, rear echelon supply and clerical troops
2) Attacking force was combat experienced SOG comrnandos, backed up by USAF fighters
3) North Vietnamese soldiers had fled into bomb shelters, NOT fighting bunkers. The shelters lacked firing ports, creating an ideal situation for employing hand grenades, which is exactly what the SOG cornmandos did. The NVA had never anticipated having to defend their camp from ground attack.
[C-42. This page duplicates page C-41]
Why Was There Minimal Enemy Resistance In the Camp?
NOTE: This enemy basecamp as not prepped wilh gas of any kind
1) Enemy forces were inexperienced, rear echelon supply and clerical troops
2) Attacking force was combat experienced SOG comrnandos, backed up by USAF fighters
3) North Vietnamese soldiers had fled into bomb shelters, NOT fighting bunkers. The shelters lacked firing ports, creating an ideal situation for employing hand grenades, which is exactly what the SOG commandos did. The NVA had never anticipated having to defend their camp from ground attack.
[C-43. Original shows about 3/4 of newspaper page; relevant article
excerpted.]
[Figure C-4]
[C-44]
[Figure C-5]
[C-45]
[Figure C-6]
[C-46]
TABLE 3. PROXIMATE DURATION OF HAZARD IN CONTAMINATED TERRAIN
WARNING: This table is intended as a guide only. Chemical agent detectors must be used to determine
the extent of actual contamination and vapor hazards.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
| | APPROX TIME AFTER CONTAMINATION THAT
| | PRESCRIBED TASKS MAY BE PERFORMED WITH
| | NEGLIGIBLE RISH1
TASK | TERRAIN | (Not wearing protective clothing)2
| | Blister Agent | Nerve Agent
| | (Mustard) | (V- or G-)
| | Temperature3 | Uniform4
| | Warm |Hot | |
| | (70o-85oF) |(85o-100oF)| Summer | Winter
| | WEARING MASKS
TRAVERSAL5 | Bare soil or low vegetation.6 | 36 hr | 36 hr | 5 hr | 2 hr
(Walking across area, | High vegetation, including jungle | 4 days | 2 days | 28 hr | 10 hr
2 hr or less) | and heavy woods. | | | |
| | NOT WEARING MASKS7
OCCUPATION | Bare soil or low vegetation.6 | 4 days | 3 days | 32 days | 13 days
(Without hitting ground,| High vegetation, including jungle | 4 days | 3 days | 32 days | 13 days
24 hr) | and heavy woods. | | | |
OCCUPATION | Bare soil or low vegetation.6 | 4 days | 3 days | 32 days | 13 days
(Involving advance | High vegetation, including jungle | 4 days | 4 days | 50 days | 18 days
under fire, 24 hr) | and heavy woods. | | | |
1. These times are safe-sided for troop safety.
2. Leather combat boots treated with protective dubbing or rubber combat boots are worn.
3. Effects of blister agent vary significantly with temperature. Mustard freezes in temperatures
below 60oF and can present a hazard when the temperature rises.
4. Protection from V-agent and thickened G-agent varies significatnly with layers of clothing worn.
5. For peronnel wlaking for 2 hours in an area contaminated by blister agents, the limiting factor is
the vapor hazard. If only a few minutes are required for traversal of the area, the task can be
initiated at earlier times than those given.
6. Times shown are not applicable to sand. which will hold chemical agents for longer periods of time
than those given.
7. The data refer to approximate times at which personnel could occupy contaminated areas without
having to wear protective masks for protection against vapor hazard.
[C-47]
[By hand] 'TAILWIND'
REFERENCE ITEM 16, USARV FORM 157-R
OTHERS RECOMMENDED FOR AN AWARD FOR THE SAME ACTION
1. CPT EUGENE C. McCAULEY, JR., 239-46-9834 - SS
2. SGT GARY M. ROSE, 549-70-0726 - DSC
3. 1LT ROBERT L. VAN BUSKIRK, 224-58-2102 - SS
4. SGT MANUEL J. OROZCO, 527-72-3764 - SS
5. SF5 CRAIG D. SCHMIDT, 543-50-1312 - SS [Lined by hand]
6. SP5 JAMES D. LUCAS, 244-68-2691 - SS
7. MSG MORRIS N. ADAIR, 451-44-6520 - BS "V"
8. SFC JAMES L. BREVELLE, 457-40-5001 - BS "V"
9. SSG WILIAM J. SCHERER, 054-36-1274 - BS "V"
10. 1LT PETER E. LANDON, 569-64-5545 - BS "V"
11. SFC DENVER G. MINTON, 270-30-3849 - BS "V"
12. SGT MICHAEL E. HAGEN, 545-86-8206 - BS "V"
13. SGT KEITH E. PLANCICH, 532-50-2990 - BX "V"
14. SFC BERHARD BRIGHT, 266-46-8766 - BS "V"
15. SGT DAVID L. YOUNG, 369-50-5139 - BS "V"
16. SGT DONALD J. BEAUDREAU, 018-42-7704 - BS "V"
[Figure C-7]
[C-49]
[Figure C-8]
[C-50]
[By hand] TAILWIND
TOP SECRET2. In September, an operation on Route 966 on the western edge of the PFAO yielded 34 documents. Some 400 pages of these were evaluated by the MACV Combined Document Exploitation Center as Category A, containing significant intelligence. They were described by MACV J2 as "appearing to be the most significant collateral intelligence on the 599th Transportation Group since the beginning of the war." 3. A POW captured in October provided further information on the 559th Transportation Group, which has the highest intelligence collection priority in Laos. He was a former member of the D2 Engineer Battalion, Binh Tram (Military Station) 34, 559th Transportation Group, and provided information on the unit's OB, its training and tactics, and on the effects of allied interdiction efforts. 4. In November, another operation in Base Area 609 found and destroyed an estimated 40 tons of rice. The cache was in an area which has been extensively used by enemy units during the periodic attacks against 5th SFGA units at Dak Seang and Ben Het, and it is believed that the rice had been stored for use by units in similar future attacks. (TS) During 1970, fewer IIR's on enemy activity and terain in the PFAO were prepared by the PF section due to revised criteria for the submission of terrain IIR's. Whereas such reports were previously written on each mission, they are now prepared only when held infor- mation is more than six months old, or when there is a discrepancy between current maps and the actual terrain. (TS) PF Intelligence Reports written and distributed during 1970 included: 1. 10 spot reports on enemy activity, provided to MACV J2 (CIIB). 2. 558 IIR's of enemy activity and terrain. (TS) Target selection and development included: 1. A total of 645 targets as compared to 864 targets in 1969. 2. Ten wiretap operations were conducted under the CIRCUS ACT program; seven were successful. (TS) A total of 436 missions were conducted during the year, as compared to 458 in 1969. 1. 540 trails were reported. 2. 39 active and inactive bivouac areas and way stations were reported. B-II-6 [By hand] 1970 SOG HISTTOP SECRET
[C-51]
TOP SECRETzone. The column was struck with 6 sorties of F-100's resulting in an estimated 100 enemy killed by air (KBA). (TS) On 25 April 1970, JCS authorized the expansion of tactical air strikes throughout Zone Alpha and on 29 April 1970 expanded the authority to use artillery and helicopter gunships in an offensive role. On 5 May 1970, JCS rescinded the requirement for close hold security on tactical airstrike reporting in Cambodia. Air strikes were then reported through normal SALEM HOUSE channels. (TS) On 27 May 1970, JCS authorized expansion of the tactical air strike authority to what is now known as the air interdiction zone (AIZ) through 30 June l970. This authority was later extended to 1 May 1971. Operation TAILWIND [By hand] Snip (TS) On 4 September 1970, CCC was alerted for the requirement to conduct a company sized operation in support of a [marked out] operation near Chavane, Laos. Project nickname was "Operation TAILWIND." Following LZ preparation by TAC AIR and the insertion of a pathfinder team, CCC, Company B, was inserted about 20 km SE of Chavane at 1232 hours 11 September 1970. Four CH-53's were used for airlift and four AH1G Cobra's for gunship support. Small arms fire was received from southwest of the insertion LZ. All CH-53's and AH1G's received hits, but all aircraft were able to return to base. (TS) The company moved northwest 500 meters where they encountered a series of hootches used for the storage of 140mm rockets, 32mm mortar ammunition, 23mm AAA ammunition, B-40 rockets, small arms ammunition, and approximately 40 dismantled bicycles. Charges with delay fuses were placed on the 140mm rockets, and the company moved northwest 1,500 meters. The company counted 30 secondary explosions immediately following detonation and 75-100 during the following five hours. (TS) Later the companyv made contact with approximately 40 enemy. The engagement lasted an hourr and tactical air strikes were employed. When the enemy broke contact, the company moved south where they began preparation of an LZ for the extraction of wounded. The LZ was com- pleted when the company again came under attack from 140-150 enemy. Nine US were wounded in this encounter, but extraction of wounded was not possible due to adverse weather. (TS) Enemy contact continued throughout the night and fire support contlnued to be provided by Spectre (C-130) gunships. When enemy action decreased, the company moved to secure an LZ at a different location. A CH-53 helicopter attempted to land for medevac of wounded but was struck by numerous small arms and B-40 rocket rounds causing it to lose power and crash. The crew was successfully extracted by ladder. The company was directed to another LZ but weather prevented extraction. B-VIII-7TOP SECRET
[C-52]
TOP SECRET(TS) Contact was again made with enemy units. This time they appeared to be defending. The company advanced on the enemy who withdrew beyond a battalion sized base camp containing 8,000 kilo- grasm of rice, as well as numerous hootches and latrines. There was evidence that the area had been used as a truck park and maintenance point as some vehicle parts were found. A 120mm mortar was found and destroyed. (TS) The company, still receiving small arms and B-40 rocket fire, then moved to an antraction HLZ. Thirty-six sets of TAC AIR were used during the extractio. The company was extracted using 3 CH-53's and returned to Dak To. Total casualties for the operation were 3 SCU KIA, 33 SCU WIA, 16 US WIA, 144 enemy KIA. 50 enemy WIA (estimated) and 288 enemy KBA (estimated). Parachute Insertions (TS) Parachute insertions were started in late summer with four static line and one High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) insertion being conducted as a means of altering the method of entry into the PFAO. 1. HALO. Chief, SOG approved the HALO insertion technique on 18 July 1870. A pilot raining program was conducted after equipment requirements were determined, personnel were selected, and coordin- ation was effected for 14 (7 US, 1 ARVN, and 6 SCU) personnel to receive training presented by the 1st Special Forces Group, (Airborne), 1st Special Forces on Okinawa. The training program was completged at Camp Long Thanh where final mission preparation took place. A six man (3 US and 3 SCU) team was inserted from a C-130 at 0200 hours on 28 November 1970 at 14,000 feet AGL. During descent the team members becaem separated because of poor visibility caused by clouds and drizzle. The team members remained separated and were extracted from four separate locations on 2 December 1970. As a method of entry this technique was considered proven as a means of entering the PFAO undetected since an active enemy search was not made to locate the team. 2. Static line. The four static line insertions were proven as successful methods of entering the PFAO but were marred by disper- sion of personnel and difficulty in assembly on the ground. Each of the missions terminated in an effort to locate and group team members. As an alternate method of insertion, parachute insertions have created a new threat that enemy LOC security forces must be preapred to counter. B-VIII-8TOP SECRET
[End Tab C]